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I. INTRODUCTION
The mere mention of a formal global citizenship – an official, internationally
recognized status with some legal effect – confounds even the most liberal
citizenship thinkers.3  Scholars who acknowledge the deterritorialization of
citizenship hesitate endorsing a formal legal status as a “citizen of the world.”4  For
those who believe that the sole site of citizenship lies in the nation-state, such
1Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
2J.D. candidate (August 2004); Editor-in-Chief, Florida Journal of International Law. 
3It should be mentioned that this definition differs from the typical use of “global”
citizenship in scholarship, where it has occasionally been taken as synonymous with 
“postnational” or “transnational” citizenship; these latter concepts, however, deal with the
informal means by which citizenship has moved beyond the bounds of the nation-state, while 
we mean to deal instead with a hypothetical formal method of doing the same thing. Linda
Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 449 (2000). 
Because the postnational forms of citizenship include such factors as the growth of economic
globalization, international political action, and worldwide sociocultural exchange, all of
which receive various levels of institutional recognition, they cannot be said to be “formal” in
the same sense as a hypothetical global passport might be.  Alejandro Portes et al., The Study
of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field, 22 ETHNIC &
RACIAL STUD. 217, 221, 223 (1999).  That said, postnationalist thought is critical to the 
analysis herein, and it will be discussed more fully below. See infra Part II.C.
4See Bosniak, supra note 3, at 448.
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proposition is intrinsically contradictory.5  Historically, the most serious objection to 
the concept of global citizenship has been the corollary need for a world government 
which objectors assume, without offering any empirical support, will be a tyrannical 
one.6
Notwithstanding the lack of support for a formal global citizenship, in recent 
years much scholarship has suggested that the world is nevertheless informally 
moving in that direction. Despite the historical reality that citizenship is centered on 
the nation-state, as a factual matter citizenship is increasingly non-national in 
character.7  For example, the growth of dual and multiple citizenship, the 
international human rights regime, and the development of a formal European Union 
citizenship all represent ways in which citizenship concepts are evolving in an 
increasingly deterritorialized way.8
Such movement away from a state-bound conception of citizenship appears to 
remove concerns about a formal global citizenship and the tyranny of its 
government.  This movement is occurring de facto, and significantly this has 
                                                                
5According to the conventional definition of the term, citizenship has “little meaning 
except in the context of a state.”  Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism, in
FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 74 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996) 
[hereinafter FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY]. 
6Interestingly, the assumption about the tyranny of a world government is often made but 
rarely justified.  Its modern philosophical grounding seems to be in Kant, who feared that such 
a government would become a “universal monarchy.”  Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian 
Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 87 (1992).  The concept was powerfully 
reinforced by Hannah Arendt when she wrote that “[a] world citizen, living under the tyranny 
of a world empire, and speaking and thinking in a kind of glorified Esperanto, would be no 
less a monster than a hermaphrodite.” HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 89 (1968).  But 
historical context is important here.  Kant wrote at the end of the 1700s, during a period where 
humankind was just beginning to rebel against the absolute monarchies which had dominated 
the early modern era (and Kant was clearly part of that rebellious, republican movement); 
Arendt, on the other hand, was a German-born Jew writing after the experiences of the Second 
World War nearly subjected the world to the same tyrannical domination she wrote of.  See
Teson, supra, at 69 (identifying Kant as a “philosopher of the ordinary people”); Seyla 
Benhabib, The Pariah and Her Shadow: Hannah Arendt’s Biography of Rahel Varnhagen, 23 
POL. THEORY 5 (1995) (discussing Arendt’s relationship to her identity as a German Jew in the 
context of her biography of Varnhagen).  What remains unanswered is whether a present day 
world government – founded on an ideal of universal affirmation, much like the United 
Nations (however infeasible such a government might be) – would inevitably be doomed to 
tyranny. 
7Bosniak, supra note 3, at 453-54. 
8Id. at 457-62.  See also Linda Bosniak, Multiple Nationality and the Postnational 
Transformation of Citizenship, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 979, 981-82 (2002) (discussing the claim 
that multiple citizenship represents a form of postnationalism); Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, 
Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organized Islam in European 
Public Spheres, 26 THEORY & SOC’Y 509, 512-13 (1997) (discussing the transnationalization 
of human rights); J. H.H. Weiler, Bread and Circus: The State of the European Union, 4 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 223, 242-43 (1998) (describing how European Union citizenship can be 
viewed as a form of “supranationalism”, and noting that “there is another more tantalizing and 
radical way of understanding the [EU’s citizenship] provision, namely as the very conceptual 
decoupling of nationality from citizenship.”). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss1/7
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occurred in the absence of a formal global nation-state.  Thus, the remaining venue 
for analysis concerning the feasibility and desirability of a global citizenship is the 
question of the relationship of citizenship to state sovereignty.  If indeed citizenship 
is denationalized, it is necessary to determine what entity will have the ultimate 
power over, and responsibility for, a particular individual with multiple alliances, 
including both national and global ones.9  An independent global citizenship without 
a local component and in the absence of the much-feared global government creates 
two concerns.  One, an individual may imperil the rights of others, without a 
structure that can impose sanctions for the heinous conduct.10  Two, an individual’s 
rights may be imperiled, and there may be no entity to provide protection.11
This essay proposes a model of a formal global citizenship that will alleviate 
these concerns and prove both practically and theoretically feasible.  The model 
flows from the concept of dual or multiple nationality and offers global citizenship 
only as an elective nationality. Such citizenship would co-exist with the nationality 
acquired by birth or naturalization, thereby guaranteeing that at least one nation-state 
always has the ultimate responsibility for the individual.  At the same time, by 
providing for careful considerations on who may acquire global citizenship, the 
value and meaning inherent in citizenship can be preserved and enhanced.12  Indeed, 
the idea of a global citizenship that is a formalized development emerging from the 
human rights tradition can be a foundation for the attainment of full personhood by 
those marginalized or disempowered within their own or foreign national borders – 
the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, indigenous populations, and women who at 
present lack equal status in any local or global community. 
To appreciate the interplay between the proposed formal global citizenship and 
the citizenship tradition, our discussion will first review citizenship theories 
grounded in the nation-state.  We then will turn to critiques of these traditionalist 
                                                                
9See Louis W. Goodman, Democracy, Sovereignty and Intervention, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 27, 27 (1993). 
10Because of the lack of a government to enforce rights over a global citizen, as we have 
defined the concept here, such citizens might be said to be “stateless” within the traditional 
meaning of the term, even though stateless persons are commonly defined as individuals with 
no nationality.  See Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany, The Nationality of the Offender and the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 606, 616 (2001) 
(discussing the problem of stateless offenders). 
11Bemma Donkoh, A Half-Century of International Refugee Protection: Who’s 
Responsible, What’s Ahead?, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 260, 266-67 (2000) (discussing the 
protection of stateless persons, and noting that the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees has been charged with intervening on the behalf of such persons). 
12Preserving the value of citizenship necessarily implies that it should not be granted 
universally to all people, despite what the phrase “global citizen” might suggest.  Rather, a 
supranational global citizenship body will be necessary to process applications for global 
citizenship.  Such an organization might be developed under the auspices of the United 
Nations, but given widely variable national acceptance of dual nationality, it is unlikely that 
global consensus could be achieved.  A less universal, but more feasible alternative is to 
establish the global citizenship body through a multilateral treaty, thus permitting states to 
recognize it only if state law allows their citizens to maintain dual nationality status.  Specific 
characteristics of such a body (and the treaty creating it) are necessarily conjecture, but the 
basic structure will be explored in Part III.A. 
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approaches which suggest that not all questions of citizenship can be dealt with in 
national terms.  The conflict between these two approaches is clear in the case of 
dual nationality, which provides the foundation for our global citizenship model.  
With that foundation in place, in Part III, ‘Towards a Formal Global Citizenship,’ we 
turn to the theoretical and practical aspects of the proposed model, particularly in the 
area of statelessness.  Finally, we can see the real-world impact of these practical 
benefits in the ongoing case of the Guantánamo prisoners. 
II.  CITIZENSHIP THEORY AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
There are two broad conceptualizations of citizenship: citizenship-as-legal-status 
and citizenship-as-desirable-activity.13  The first conceives of citizenship as a 
formalized relationship between a community and its members, while the second 
talks about participation and identification as the defining characteristics of 
citizenship.14  Citizenship-as-legal-status is a legal and political understanding of 
citizenship; citizenship-as-desirable-activity is a philosophical and moral one.  One 
critique of this dichotomy is that the two categories overlap a great deal, in that 
certain moral understandings of citizenship imply support for corresponding legal 
definitions of citizenship.  For example, the cosmopolitan’s moral embrace of 
humankind as the basic unit of value, rather than the members of one’s own family, 
community, or nation, implies the postnational legal conception of citizenship, which 
transcends states as the sole means of granting or defining citizenship.15  The 
analysis is often more complex, however; a cosmopolitan may embrace the 
betterment of humanity as a moral virtue for which to strive, but in accordance with 
the cosmopolitan mantra “think globally, act locally,” such a cosmopolitan may 
prefer the civic republican approach to citizenship-as-legal-status, which advocates 
devotion to the community in which one resides.16  Below, we discuss the legal and 
philosophical views of citizenship as separate. It is noteworthy that while their 
presentation below preserves the separations that have historically developed, they 
do not exist in isolation. 
A.  The Legal View: Citizenship-as-Legal-Status 
In the wake of World War II, modern citizenship theory developed the idea of 
“passive” or “private” citizenship.17  This view of citizenship stresses the importance 
of membership in society by guaranteeing rights to certain persons who are 
                                                                
13Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on 
Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 353 (1994). 
14Id.
15We should remark at this point that our choice of “cosmopolitanism” to refer to 
philosophical trends grounded in the Stoics and Kant is a potentially risky one, given that the 
term was at one time associated with anti-Semitic meaning.  JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE 
POSTMODERN EXPLAINED: CORRESPONDENCE 1982-1985 47 (Julian Pefanis & Morgan Thomas 
eds., Don Barry et al. trans., 1992). Throughout this work, we use cosmopolitanism to mean 
the idea that human beings can form part of a unitary community that should be nurtured, 
rather than any connotation that might imply tribalism or ultranationalism. 
16See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1007, 1042-46 (2001). 
17Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 13, at 354-55. 
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members–the citizens–and denying them to noncitizen “outsiders.”18  These rights 
are passive, as they are acquired without any effort on the part of the individual 
citizen.19
  In passive citizenship, a strong welfare state is necessary to assure a citizen's 
rights by helping all citizens feel like equal members of society, and permitting the 
poor to exercise their political rights on a par with the rich.20  Significantly, this is 
also the basis of criticisms of passive citizenship.  By guaranteeing rights without 
requiring active participation in the state, passive citizenship makes citizens 
dependent on the state for their political identities; this is the “New Right” view of 
citizenship.21  Instead of guaranteeing rights for all citizens regardless of their 
participation in society, the New Right seeks to reduce the welfare state and to 
develop a system of mutual obligation that assures the grant of full and equal rights 
only to those who make an economic contribution to society.22  However, when this 
view was put into actual practice, reducing the welfare state did little to make the 
poor more responsible citizens, and succeeded only in reducing their ability to 
participate economically in society.23
The tensions exhibited by the passive citizenship and New Right models gave 
rise to a series of new approaches to citizenship-as-legal-status which charted a 
middle course involving “a balance of rights and responsibilities.”24  Two of the 
novel approaches have had a marked impact on recent citizenship thought, 
particularly with respect to globalization–the civic republican and civil society 
models.  Civic republicanism’s virtues lie in a “committed engagement in the life of 
the polity” and a “willing commitment to the common good” as contrasted with the 
atomistic, solely self-interested goals of the liberal rights-based approaches.25  Civic 
republicanism’s harshest criticism is grounded on the observation that, while it treats 
political participation (rather than personal attachments) as an ideal and perfect goal, 
such is not the reality for the overwhelming majority of humankind.26  In contrast, 
the civil society model stresses the ultimate importance of participation in the 
political community.  However, it also suggests that the exchange of membership 
responsibilities for guaranteed rights is learned in the personal spaces associated with 
                                                                
18Id.; see also T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 71-73 
(1964).
19Id.  This is also substantially similar to Gerald Neuman’s definition of unilateral 
liberalism, though he approaches the matter from the standpoint of naturalization; the choice 
to naturalize is that of the individual, but once that choice is made, the rights attendant to 
citizenship are guaranteed.  See Gerald Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 
VA. J. INT’L L. 237, 238-39 (1994). 
20Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 13, at 354-55. 
21Id. at 355-56. 
22Id. at 356. 
23Id. at 356-57. 
24Id. at 360. 
25Neuman, supra note 19, at 240, 245. 
26Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY:
PLURALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY 89, 92 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992). 
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civil society–church, family, and other elective associations.27  The critique of the 
civil society model warns that the virtues learned in those spaces may be intolerance, 
discrimination, and suspicion of one’s fellow man, all of which are at odds with the 
democratic nature considered ideal in our polity.28  In addition, the civil society 
model may be misguided in relying on voluntary associations to provide civic virtue 
because, quite simply, these organizations do not exist to teach virtue to their 
members.29  Rather, they exist to promote and protect the status quo. 
Citizenship-as-legal-status raises one more tangential dilemma: the interrogation 
of the importance of maintaining the value of citizenship.  Even if we presuppose the 
decline of nation-state sovereignty, states themselves still exist, and “[t]he state still 
stands for something, as do the societies that states represent.”30  Societies have an 
interest in preserving their uniqueness, and to do so, states must remain closed 
groups.31  Modern conceptions of state citizenship might be likened to a club, where 
an admissions committee decides who should be members, what the requirements for 
entry are, and the rights and responsibilities to be derived from such membership.32
B.  The Philosophical View: Citizenship-as-Desirable-Activity 
The citizenship-as-desirable-activity model treats citizenship as a matter of 
personal identification and belonging. One such view is advocated by 
cosmopolitanism which, as a philosophy, was created by the Stoics, revitalized by 
Kant, and is inherent in many of the international legal developments of the past 
century.33  Although cosmopolitanism “has been used to describe a wide variety of 
important views in moral and socio-political philosophy,” at its center all versions 
agree with a central idea: “all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, 
do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that this community should be 
cultivated.”34 Cosmopolitanism raises numerous concerns, two of which can be 
designated as ethical/moral and cultural.35  Ethical or moral cosmopolitanism “is a 
                                                                
27Id. at 104. 
28Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 13, at 363-64. 
29Id. at 364. 
30Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 
1479-80 (1997). 
31Yaffa Zilbershats, Reconsidering the Concept of Citizenship, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 689, 696 
(2001).
32Id. at 696-97. 
33A full discussion of the history of cosmopolitanism is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
for just such a review, see generally Derek Heater, Cosmopolis, The Way to Peace?, 9 PEACE
REV. 315 (1997). 
34Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown, Cosmopolitanism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2002), at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/ (last visited August 
29, 2003). 
35Id.; Bernard Yack, Cosmopolitan Humility, BOSTON REV., Feb.-Mar. 1995, at 17.  A 
third strand is political cosmopolitanism, which centers around the notion of international 
political arrangements ranging from advocates of a world state to those who favor 
international political institutions that direct their attention to particular issues.  See Kleingeld 
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perspective committed to the well-being of humanity at large, rather than any 
particular community of persons.”36  A cultural cosmopolitan, on the other hand, has 
been described as one who “learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in 
Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment, 
follows Ukrainian politics, and practices Buddhist meditation techniques.”37
Cosmopolitans have heralded globalization as a final vindication of an ancient 
ideal–the “citizen of the world” originally envisioned by the Stoics.38  In the 
development of a system of international law that respects human rights, ethical 
cosmopolitans see the incorporation of Kantian ideals.39  Similarly, a multivariate 
culture, with elements of numerous cultures involved in one’s daily life, is a direct 
result of the increased international trade and travel that has come along with 
globalization.40  But cosmopolitanism is not without its critics.  Cultural 
cosmopolitanism has been lambasted as destructive of the very cultural diversity it 
purports to protect, and as possibly encouraging extreme nationalism or tribalism.41
By encouraging the homogenization of culture, such universalism threatens to 
destroy the very things that make cultures unique.42
Ethical cosmopolitanism has received its share of criticism as well.  In opposition 
to the moral universalism espoused by cosmopolitanism are statist or nationalist 
philosophies.43  These philosophies propose that cosmopolitanism is misguided 
because individuals cannot conceive of humanity as a whole, let alone interact with 
it; rather, individuals interact only within their immediate communities and thus their 
                                                          
& Brown, supra note 34.  The largest critique of political cosmopolitanism addresses the 
impossibility of supplanting nation-states with a world-system of governance.  Id.; see also
discussion supra note 6. 
36See Kleingeld & Brown, supra note 34 (defining moral cosmopolitanism as “a ‘moral’ 
commitment to helping human beings as such.”). 
37Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 751, 754 (1992); see also Kleingeld & Brown, supra note 34 (rejecting “attachment 
to parochial culture,” encouraging “cultural diversity and appreciat[ing] a multicultural 
mélange” while “reject[ing] strong nationalism.”). 
38See Bosniak, supra note 3, at 448. 
39David Held, What Hope for the Future?: Learning the Lessons of the Past, 9 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 381, 382 (2002) (“Immanuel Kant wrote over two hundred years ago that 
we are ‘unavoidably side by side.’  A violent challenge to law and justice in one place has 
consequences for many other places and can be experienced everywhere.”).  Held goes on to 
state that “[c]osmopolitan principles are not principles for some remote utopia; they are at the 
center of significant post-Second World War legal and political developments, from the 1948 
UN Declaration of Human Rights to the 1998 adoption of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.”  Id. at 399. 
40See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Human Rights, Globalization and Culture, in
MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 353, 361 (Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol 
ed., 2002). 
41Id.; see also supra notes 15 and 37.
42Hernández-Truyol, supra note 40, at 361.
43See Chander, supra note 16, at 1007. 
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conception of self is necessarily locally grounded.44  The flaw in this argument is that 
individuals should be no more able to conceive of and identify with a billion of their 
fellow citizens (as a citizen of India or China might possess) than they should be able 
to relate with six-and-a-half-billion of their fellow humans.45  A connected question 
is why persons who happen to be our fellow citizens–a largely accidental group of 
cohorts–should take precedence over those with whom we consciously identify.46
Rather than engage these questions directly, the trend has been to extol the virtues of 
the nation-state as the ideal focus for one’s moral engagement with one’s fellow 
humans; in doing so, statists acknowledge globalizing trends but deny that they have 
replaced the state.47
C.  Recent Critiques 
Recently, scholars focusing on the postnationalization, transnationalization, 
denationalization, or globalization of citizenship have challenged the idea that 
citizenship must necessarily be grounded in the nation-state, the notion underlying 
traditional legal conceptions of citizenship.48  With postnationalization the focus is 
on a variety of international activities that in isolation constitute only scattered 
instances of cross-border activity, but as a whole represent a major shift in 
understanding citizenship.49  Rather than defining citizenship as a relationship 
between an individual and a state, postnationalism embraces a much broader array of 
interactions between individuals, states, and NGOs.50  These interactions are present 
in a number of recent developments: an increase of dual and multiple nationality;51
the development of an international human rights regime;52 the internationalization 
of political activity through NGOs;53 and a sense of transnational belonging held by 
                                                                
44Bosniak, supra note 3, at 496-97. 
45CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2003), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited August 23, 2003). 
46Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra
note 5, at 3, 7 (“The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident.”). 
47Bosniak, supra note 3, at 498-99. 
48Id. at 449 n.6.  “Postnationalism” speaks of these trends in citizenship theory. 
49See id.
50See id. at 450.  In general terms these include “cross-border organizing efforts in the 
areas, for example, of human rights, the environment, arms control, women’s rights, labor 
rights, and the rights of national minorities.”  Id. at 474. 
51Soysal, supra note 8, at 512.  But see Bosniak, supra note 8, at 1003 (arguing that 
multiple nationality is not destroying the nation-state as the locus of citizenship, but simply 
multiplying it). 
52But see Bosniak, supra note 3, at 467-69 (arguing that one should be careful in placing 
too much emphasis on the development of international human rights as a form of 
postnationality, as the regime actually does fairly little to protect the individual).
53Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, International Law, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 567, 571 (2000) (recognizing that “non-state actors enjoy expanded formal rights of 
participation in intergovernmental standard-setting processes and often perform delegated 
monitoring and enforcement functions.”). 
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many individuals, especially among immigrant communities that retain ties to their 
country of origin.54  Postnationalism does not discount the viability or significance of 
conventional nation-state citizenship; rather, it conceives of these more traditional 
concepts as one facet of a “citizenship that is multiple and overlapping.”55
The significance of these trends is a subject of much debate.  Some suggest that 
the increase of extranational modes of citizenship represents a decline of state 
sovereignty.56  Others, however, point to the rise of new nation-states following the 
collapse of old empires, and nationalistic impulses on the part of many groups 
around the world, as evidence that the nation-state remains strong despite these 
globalizing trends.57  Some seek to resolve this tension by charting a middle road, 
suggesting that postnational forms of citizenship can exist and retain significance 
without necessarily derogating the importance of national citizenship.58  We propose 
a third way which, rather than attempting to chart a middle course, rejects the 
either/or posture and takes a both/and approach.  We posit that, while globalization 
does erode sovereignty, it merely changes rather than devalues the nation-state.  
Thus, while the question of whether postnationalism represents a global citizenship 
in lieu of a national one is contested intellectual terrain, under our third way a 
codification of these postnational trends through a formal global citizenship still 
requires the assent of states from which more conventional ideas of citizenship are 
derived.  Therefore, we conceive of a formal global citizenship as existing in tandem 
with, rather than as a replacement for or in opposition to, national citizenship. 
D.  Dual Nationality 
The concept of dual nationality is of utility in conceiving of global citizenship as 
coexisting rather than competing with national citizenship.59  To be sure, dual 
nationality is also contested terrain in the citizenship field. 60  As such, it has both 
theoretical and practical ramifications for a formal global citizenship model. 
Governments tend to disfavor dual nationality because it creates an individual “of 
                                                                
54Maria Patricia Fernández-Kelly, Immigration, Poverty and Transnationalism, in MORAL 
IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 40, at 337, 344. 
55Bosniak, supra note 3, at 450. 
56See generally SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN 
THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996); Saskia Sassen, Economic Globalization and the Redrawing of 
Citizenship, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 40, at 135. 
57Schuck, supra note 27, at 10.  See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVERIGNTY:
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999). 
58See Bosniak, supra note 8, at 1003. 
59The basic definition of dual or multiple nationality is “[t]he simultaneous retention of 
more than one nationality.” STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 1219 n.12 (3d ed. 2002).  While theoretically simple, the reality is somewhat more 
complex, because “every sovereign state decides who its own nationals are”, “the typical law 
provides alternative, multiple routes to nationality,” and “the rules vary from state to state.”  
Id. at 1219. 
60“Until very recently, the nearly unbroken scholarly tradition has been to tolerate dual 
citizenship but not to applaud it.”  Id. at 1221. 
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divided, and often conflicting, loyalties and duties.”61  Dual nationals may lead to 
international tensions when two countries attempt to exert control over them, and 
create security problems in times of war, such as the possibility of sabotage or 
treason on behalf of one nation (and nationality) against the other.62  Because 
citizenship is a domestic, not an international, concern, nations are free to limit their 
citizens’ ability to obtain dual nationality, and many have done just that.  Of the 
countries responding to a 1998 survey, only about half (66 out of 128) had some 
form of dual nationality.63  At the same time, states (even some of which permit dual 
nationality) have made efforts to limit dual nationality on the international level 
through bilateral and multilateral agreements, such as the Convention on the 
Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality.64
While dual nationality as a paradigm is often disfavored formally, restrictions 
against such status are often systematically ignored, giving way to the reality that 
around the world people, beyond their multiple informal allegiances to more than 
one nation-state, frequently enjoy formal allegiances to two or more nations.  In the 
United States, for example, citizens who naturalize elsewhere violate the oath of 
allegiance and may be expatriated (i.e. lose their citizenship).65  The U.S. Supreme 
Court, however, has held that even a citizen who knowingly and voluntarily applies 
for citizenship in another country cannot lose his or her U.S. citizenship unless that 
individual expressly intends to renounce it.66  This tacit acceptance of dual 
nationality evidences “the transformed nature of citizenship in a postnational world, 
a world in which national affiliations no longer clearly trump other associational 
                                                                
61David S. Gordon, Section V Civil Rights: Dual Nationality and the United States Citizen,
102 MIL. L. REV. 181 (1983). 
62Spiro, supra note 30, at 1414-15.  Though not strictly a case of dual nationality, the 
bombing of the UN building in Baghdad provides a chilling example of the effect divided 
loyalties can have.  Iraqi security guards employed by the UN–their loyalty potentially split 
between the ousted Hussein regime and the occupying government overseen by the UN–are 
being investigated as potential co-conspirators in the attack.  See Gareth Smyth, Iraq’s
Political Groups Seek Role in Security: Aftermath of UN Bombing, THE FINANCIAL TIMES
(LONDON), August 23, 2003, at 6. 
63Eugene Goldstein and Victoria Piazza, Naturalization, Dual Citizenship and Retention of 
Foreign Citizenship: A Survey, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1613, 1629-32 (1998). 
64Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in 
Cases of Multiple Nationality, May 6, 1963, 634 U.N.T.S. 221 (stating “that cases of multiple 
nationality are liable to cause difficulties and that joint action to reduce as far as possible the 
number of cases of multiple nationality, as between member States, corresponds to the aims of 
the Council of Europe.”). 
65For the oath of renunciation and allegiance, see Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 
U.S.C. § 1448 (1997); for means by which nationality can be lost, see Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1997). 
66See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 255 (1967). 
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attachments . . . .”67  The rise of dual nationality shows a domestic trend, rather than 
a global phenomenon.68
Currently, there is vigorous ongoing debate as to what extent the increasing 
incidence of dual nationality is a sign of weakening state sovereignty.69  What is 
patent, however, is that dual nationality is a status with increasing importance–both 
to individuals and to nation-states–which appears with increasing regularity in the 
present world.  Moreover, dual national status can at times provide “unique 
advantages in terms of freedom of movement and of economic establishment,” 
garner dual nationals “international protection from both governments,” and offer 
opportunities for political participation in both locations of loyalty.70
III.  TOWARDS A FORMAL GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
A.  Theoretical Ramifications 
Notwithstanding the lack of universal support for dual nationality, it is a useful 
paradigm for interrogating the viability and desirability of a formal global 
citizenship.  For example, countries that prohibit their own citizens from maintaining 
dual nationality are unlikely to support a formal global citizenship that may be 
perceived to interfere with their unfettered sovereign claim over such citizens.  The 
global citizenship to be proposed is likely to require the consent of sovereigns 
through a multilateral treaty, thus permitting objecting countries to refuse recognition 
of global passport holders. However, in light of the de facto globalized citizenship 
model that has emerged through the human rights system, a formalized global 
citizenship should be aspirationally universally embraced.71  The formal global 
citizenship we propose will avoid the basic problem with dual nationality—the 
interplay of supremacy between two sovereign bodies (traditionally, nation-states). 72
The model proposed would neither create nor require a global government which 
would inevitably struggle with individual nation-states for ultimate authority over 
individuals.  Consequently, even those nations that discourage dual nationality might 
find formal global citizenship a workable model. 
Global citizenship is a model based on the idea of the universality of human 
rights to which all people are entitled by virtue of their humanness.  Formally, it has 
four basic characteristics. 
1)  A formal global citizenship must protect the trappings of personhood 
by being grounded in human rights norms.  Insofar as states may infringe 
                                                                
67Spiro, supra note 30, at 1416. 
68Bosniak, supra note 8, at 998 (“To the extent that dual or multiple nationality is 
increasingly tolerated today, this tolerance is a function of states’ own decisions.”). 
69See id. at 992-95; Zilbershats, supra note 31, at 725-33. 
70Gordon, supra note 61, at 181; Fernández-Kelly, supra note 54, at 347.  
71See, e.g., Hernández-Truyol, supra note 40, at 353; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward 
a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 40, at 39. 
72Zilbershats, supra note 31, at 732. 
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on these rights, global citizenship must endeavor to advance the cause of 
those who hold it on the international plane. 
2)  A formal global citizenship must defer to the nation-state as the site of 
the individual's “primary” citizenship.  This is chiefly a matter of making 
global citizenship palatable, both theoretically, since many citizenship 
theories require the primary focus of one's political energies on the polity, 
and practically, since nations are unlikely to agree to any structure that 
significantly derogates from their sovereignty. 
3)  Formal global citizenship must be established by multilateral treaty.  
This is important, since it permits nations to opt out of the formal global 
citizenship apparatus if they so choose.  Such a treaty must also by its 
terms prevent the passage of global citizenship from person to person, 
requiring instead that they actively seek it.  By doing so, global citizens 
can be assured that world citizenship does not simply represent a valueless 
status granted on everyone in the world (as the name might otherwise 
imply).  At the same time, because those possessing global citizenship 
must make a conscious effort to acquire it, its possession will maintain 
significance for them. 
4)  Formal global citizenship will require a structure to review petitions 
for global citizenship, but one that would include both substantive and 
procedural normative standards that would not encroach on sovereign 
prerogatives of states such as taxation, conscription, or prosecution.  A 
workable global citizenship model must provide for an admissions 
committee and admissions procedure to consider applications and any 
disputes that may arise surrounding them. 
Each of the citizenship theories discussed above creates hurdles that any 
workable model of global citizenship must overcome.  These problems exist because, 
fundamentally, the traditional views of citizenship assume the nation-state to be the 
ultimate site of citizenship, and insist on the high value of political participation, 
either in the nation-state or in some component thereof.  The agreeability of a formal 
global citizenship with such ideas depends heavily on the value placed on such 
political participation.  For example, the passive citizenship model stresses the rights 
guaranteed to citizens, and sees political participation as a benefit to be derived from 
these rights.73  In the model presented here, the global citizen will ultimately derive 
rights from the nation-state–not only by possessing a nation-state citizenship as one’s 
“primary” citizenship but also by virtue of the nation-state’s acquiescence to formal 
global citizenship through a treaty or other international agreement–and 
consequently, the role of the nation-state in passive citizenship is secure.  Only 
insofar as the global citizen enjoys unequal rights in comparison to other global 
citizens might problems exist. 
The New Right approach, however, complicates matters by adding to the 
equation the responsibilities of the citizen to participate actively in the community.74
                                                                
73See Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 13, at 354. 
74Id. at 356. 
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The New Right model is grounded in the need to be an economic participant.  Given 
the reality that a global citizenship favors and facilitates free movement, being an 
economic participant is more likely for global citizens. 
Civic republicanism, however, presents a much greater problem than the passive 
citizenship and New Right approaches.  In requiring a commitment to the polity as 
opposed to individual goals, civic republicans require not only the location of 
citizenship in the nation-state, but also the focus of individuals’ political energies on 
only one nation-state.75  It is the civic republican's position that dual nationality itself 
is only valuable insofar as it encourages participation in a polity where one resides 
but could not otherwise participate.76  Under a civic republican model, dual citizens 
should not be permitted to exercise political rights in both venues.77  Civic 
republicanism also demands the preservation of the value of citizen status, which has 
significance for both national and global citizenship.  Formal global citizenship must 
simultaneously offer its own value, and avoid infringing on the value of nation-state 
citizenship. 
Given that civic republicanism does not embrace dual nationality except in very 
specific circumstances, it cannot be reconciled with a global citizenship based on 
dual nationality.  On the other hand, as a practical matter, the lack of a global 
government in which to participate makes it perfectly plausible to devote the whole 
of one’s political energy to the nation-state of one's primary citizenship.  Civil 
society theory, in contrast, is fully compatible with a formal global citizenship.  By 
preventing the transmission of formal global citizenship by blood (jus sanguinis) or 
soil (jus soli), gaining global citizenship essentially represents another form of 
elective association.78  The value learned from electing to associate with a world 
community is responsibility to the global rather than simply the local.  Consequently, 
civil society theory may also comport well with cosmopolitan philosophy.  And, as 
with civic republicanism, because there is no global government to distract the 
political activities of a global citizen, an individual’s political energies can be 
directed solely towards the state where he or she holds primary citizenship. 
From a philosophical standpoint, the global citizenship structure proposed here 
might appear inherently cosmopolitan; after all, it would quite literally create 
“citizens of the world.”  But statist doctrine has its place, not so much in elevating 
the nation-state as an ideal mode of moral engagement but in cautioning against the 
excesses of cosmopolitanism.  In advocating ethical/moral and cultural universalism, 
                                                                
75David A. Martin, New Rules on Dual Nationality for a Democratizing Globe: Between 
Rejection and Embrace, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 22 (1999).  (“[E]ncouraging full engagement 
in a single polity is a valid goal, consistent with healthy democracy (and especially so within a 
civic republican conception of democracy).”). 
76David A. Martin, The Civic Republican Ideal for Citizenship, and for Our Common Life,
35 VA. J. INT’L L. 301, 310 (1994). 
77See id. at 315. 
78Literally meaning “right of the blood”, jus sanguinis transfers to an individual the 
nationality of their parents, no matter where they happen to be born.  LEGOMSKY, supra note 
59, at 1193.  In contrast, jus soli, meaning “right of the land”, grants to an individual the 
nationality of the country born in, no matter the nationality of the person’s parents.  Id.  These 
two principles are the means by which one might acquire citizenship on birth; the third 
method, naturalization, is how one acquires citizenship after birth.  Id. at 1203. 
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cosmopolitanism runs the risk of becoming ethically and culturally tyrannical.  It is 
therefore vital to keep in mind, when considering the ethical cosmopolitan focus on 
humankind as a whole, that humankind is at some basic level comprised of 
individuals.79  On a moral level, then, it is important to concentrate on the moral 
good in protecting individual needs for sustenance and personal development as the 
root motivation underlying international human rights initiatives, rather than 
stressing the moral benefits of such rights to humanity as a whole.80  By giving 
individuals global significance in a genuine institutional framework, a world 
citizenship could do much to further this goal.81  Similarly, we must remain wary of 
cultural cosmopolitanism, which might grant no special defense to minority cultures 
in the face of cultural universalism.82  Indeed, if we hope to gain from global 
citizenship the sorts of cultural benefits discussed in this essay, it is imperative that 
minority cultures be defended zealously.  And again, global citizenship, by providing 
members of such cultures with a global voice that they might lack when subsumed 
within a nation-state, could further this goal. 
To be sure, the human rights model provides a template for the creation of this 
global voice by granting to individuals certain rights which are presumptively non-
derogable.83  Arising in response to the experiences of World War II and the Nazi 
war atrocities, the human rights regime fundamentally redefined the relationship of 
the individual to the nation-state by making human beings subjects, rather than 
simply objects, of international law.84  Significantly for the model presented here, 
this redefinition resulted in a concept of personhood beyond traditional definitions 
grounded in territory or citizenship.85  Though human rights have had a clear impact 
on sovereigns vis-a-vis individuals, many times the rights guaranteed are ignored 
when expedient for the sovereign.86  The formal global citizenship model can, 
however, provide a practical as well as symbolic corollary to the rights theoretically 
guaranteed by the international human rights system. 
B.  Formal Global Citizenship and the Stateless 
A formal global citizenship grounded on human rights principles in the context of 
a postnational system fundamentally divorced from the nation-state permits a greater 
number of individuals to enjoy their theoretically non-derogable rights.  The 
separation of the citizen from the nation-state and the nation-state from the citizen 
                                                                
79This essential distinction is, it might be hypothesized, at the root of the cosmopolitan 
mantra “think globally, act locally”.  See Chander, supra note 16, at 1043-44. 
80See generally Held, supra note 39, at 398-99. 
81See Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 51 
(discussing the importance of an institutional framework in the furtherance of human rights 
goals).
82Waldron, supra note 37, at 762. 
83International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art 4., 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
84Hernández-Truyol, supra note 40, at 353. 
85Id.
86The Guantánamo situation is an excellent example of this.  See infra Part IV. 
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gives rise to an interaction which is deterritorialized, relational, and identity-based.  
This identity-based model allows legal discourse between individuals and states on 
social and cultural grounds, where previously the interrogation would end when the 
legal status (that is, nationality) of the individual was determined.  The 
deterritorialized aspect of this interrelation creates a functional national relationship 
based, not on the nation's view of the individual, but rather the individual's view of 
themselves. 
Consequently, the chief beneficiaries of global citizenship are the stateless.87
Some have suggested that dual nationality could be of benefit to the stateless by 
providing an alternate site of citizenship in the event one nationality is lost.88
Continuing the analogy to dual nationality, global citizenship could be of value to the 
stateless by giving them a “fall-back” position.  It should be stressed, though, that 
even for the stateless, global citizenship would not provide a “primary” citizenship–
rather, it would provide a secondary citizenship while awaiting the resolution of the 
individual’s primary nationality.  This status might also lend legitimacy to the claim 
of responsibility by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees over 
stateless persons, mandated by the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness.89  This would be especially true if the global citizenship agency was 
organized under the auspices of the United Nations. 
A formal global citizenship goes further.  The deterritorialized conception of 
nationality cannot directly solve the problem of statelessness, but conceiving of 
nationality in such terms is of great utility to those seeking redress for international 
wrongs.  Identifying individuals with nations that share their cultural or social norms 
permits a stateless individual to bring to their plight to the attention of a nation.  In 
doing so, internationally recognized processes and human rights can be enforced, and 
problems of fundamental justice for the stateless can be obviated.  This combines 
two theoretical aspects of citizenship–the identification aspect of cosmopolitan 
philosophy, and the human rights aspect of postnational theory–to provide a single, 
functional aspect of a legal status as a nation's citizen, the right to petition the 
government of that nation to uphold one's interests on the international plane.  Of 
course, to uphold a concept of justice requires that the individual must be able to 
designate a nation or nations with which they most closely identify, to prevent the 
nation with control of the stateless individual from dictating the individual's interests 
to them.  Conversely, the nation designated by the individual must have the freedom 
to take up their cause or not as they see fit, as is traditional on the international plane.  
In short, what is guaranteed by formal global citizenship is not the right of the 
stateless individual to their human rights, many of which are non-derogable; it is 
instead the right of states to come to the aid of stateless individuals who identify with 
them. 
IV.  GUANTÁNAMO BAY AND GLOBAL CITIZENS
To be of utility, a formal global citizenship must first be practical.  It must 
provide real people with actual advantages they would not enjoy in the absence of 
                                                                
87As mentioned above, the term is one that applies to individuals with no nationality.  See
discussion supra note 10. 
88See, e.g., Martin, supra note 76, at 311. 
89See Donkoh, supra note 11, at 266-67. 
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global citizen status.  Recent events provide us an all-too-real lens through which to 
examine the practical benefits of a formal global citizenship, particularly with regard 
to the plight of the stateless. 
By now the events of September 11th, 2001 are known worldwide.  On that day, 
a group of terrorists equipped with box cutters seized control of four planes and used 
them to launch attacks against the World Trade Center towers in New York and the 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C.  The United States quickly linked these attacks to the 
terrorist network Al Qaeda, and used that link to justify a “war on terror.”  The initial 
action in this new kind of war was the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom on 
October 7th, 2001 against Al Qaeda and the Taliban group, in effective control of 
much of Afghanistan, that harbored them.  What is not as widely known as these 
facts is the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom, and the human rights crisis 
that has subsequently developed.  Though the U.S.-led offensive was over in a matter 
of weeks, it took over 600 prisoners, most of whom are now held at the U.S. naval 
base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.90  Now, more than two years later, the status of most 
of these individuals remains unclear. 
This situation is particularly distressing when examined from a human rights 
perspective.  The prisoners at Guantánamo have been held in cramped, chain-link 
cages and are allowed only 20 minutes of activity three times a week.91  They are 
limited in their communication with each other and with the outside world, with 
censorship of their letters commonplace.92  Additionally, at least three juveniles are 
held at Guantánamo Bay in a facility called Camp Iguana, all “boys between the ages 
of 13 and 15.”93  The United States government asserts that the prisoners at 
Guantánamo, as well as those at Baghram Air Force Base in Afghanistan and on the 
island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (both of which have also been used to 
house prisoners) are well-cared for, and their physical and spiritual needs have been 
attended to.94  However, there have been at least two deaths and a number of suicide 
                                                                
90The precise number of individuals currently held at Guantánamo is unclear; the U.S. has 
prohibited unrestricted access to the prisoners and has not been particularly forthcoming with 
information about their status.  The most recent estimates put the number at 680, hailing from 
40 different countries.  See Sarah Lyall, Death Penalty Ruled Out for Two British Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at A4. 
91Ted Conover, In the Land of Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES June 29, 2003, Section 6 at 40. 
92Letter from Michael Ratner, Center for Constitutional Rights, to Santiago Canton, 
Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 8-9 (Mar. 4, 2003), at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/OASTotureLetter.pdf (last visited August 23, 2003) 
[hereinafter CCR Letter]. 
93Conover, supra note 91. 
94For example, prisoners at Guantánamo are provided with prayer caps, oils, beads, copies 
of the Koran, and access to a Muslim chaplain; they are also provided with “a diet that is 
similar to that of the soldiers who guard them”, prepared in accordance with the appropriate 
Islamic procedures.  Neil A. Lewis, Detainees from the Afghan War Remain in a Legal Limbo 
in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at A1.  However, conditions at Baghram Air Force Base 
in Afghanistan may be a good deal worse.  See infra note 99.  The status of any prisoners held 
at Diego Garcia remains unknown, as the base is off-limits to all but military personnel.  See
CCR Letter, supra note 92, at 8. 
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attempts at the camps over the last two years.95  Additionally, many of the assertions 
made by prisoners in their correspondence, or by former prisoners, allege specific 
instances of maltreatment.  Some reports suggest that prisoners are “made to stand 
hooded, their arms raised and chained to the ceiling, their feet shackled, unable to 
move for hours at a time, day and night,” sometimes while forced to remain naked.96
One prisoner claims to have not seen the sun for most of a year.97  These conditions 
have, unsurprisingly, led many prisoners to deteriorate in physical and mental 
health.98  There are also some assertions that captors have taken more active roles in 
inflicting physical and psychological damage.99
The United States has taken a stance that suggests the Guantánamo prisoners are 
unequal to non-captives in both legal and human rights; in essence, that they lack 
personhood as conceived of in the traditional citizenship sense.  While the 
Guantánamo prisoners have received some modicum of respect for their cultural 
rights (such as the accommodation of their religious beliefs), two areas that have 
particularly suffered are the legal and civil rights of the prisoners.  For example, no 
Guantánamo captive has been permitted to consult with an attorney, and none has yet 
been charged with any crime.100  Many have been moved from country to country 
while their habeas corpus petitions were still pending.101  This is the benefit of 
                                                                
95Both deaths were at Baghram Air Force Base, and one was classified as a homicide; the 
other remains unexplained.  See Carlotta Gall, Threats and Responses: Prisoners; U.S. 
Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A14.  The 
documented suicide attempts were at Guantánamo, and by late June the number was 28 
attempts by 18 prisoners.  Conover, supra note 91.  One prisoner is in a persistent vegetative 
state as a result.  Id.
96Gall, supra note 95. 
97CCR Letter, supra note 92, at 2. 
98Id.  A number of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay are suffering from serious depression 
which has required psychiatric medication in some cases.  See Conover, supra note 91. 
99Most accusations of physical or mental abuse have emanated from Baghram, where one 
section, operated by the CIA, is off-limits to even the Red Cross.  Vikram Dodd, The UK 
Businessmen Trapped In Guantánamo, The Guardian (London), July 11, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,12469,995989,00.html (last visited August 23, 
2003).  One portion of Baghram is “commonly associated with accusations of torture by US 
agents”, and one technique has come to be referred to by the sinister title “torture light”.  Id.
This is substantiated by U.S. officials, who suggested after the capture of Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed that the CIA would “use every means at its disposal, short of what it considers 
outright torture, to try to crack him”.  Eric Lichtblau and Adam Liptak, Questioning to Be 
Legal, Humane, and Aggressive, The White House Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A13.  
What is unclear, of course, is whether “what it” – that is, what the CIA considers torture 
comports with the U.S. and international definitions of that term. 
100See Lyall, supra note 90.  The sole attempt to try any of the prisoners–specifically, six 
prisoners, including two Britons and one Australian–before a military tribunal was met with a 
storm of criticism, largely from Britons who feared their countrymen could receive the death 
penalty.  Id.
101See, e.g., CCR Letter, supra note 92, at 2, 4.  This appears to be part of what might be 
termed a “shell game” on the part of the U.S. government to keep prisoners out of the 
jurisdictional reach of any court. 
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Guantánamo to the United States; situated on the soil of a nominally hostile nation, it 
is technically extraterritorial, and therefore no U.S. court has jurisdiction to review 
the legal status of the prisoners there.102  Additionally, the United States has 
designated the prisoners “unlawful combatants” in an attempt to deny them 
protections they would otherwise enjoy under the laws of war.103  Perhaps worst of 
all is the simple fact that, while some of the Guantánamo detainees are dangerous 
terrorists, many have been identified as entirely uninvolved with the Taliban, Al 
Qaeda, or terror—and yet remain in captivity, with no legal recourse.104
The Guantánamo prisoners have also suffered a significant derogation of their 
presumably non-derogable human rights.  It is, of course, difficult to determine 
which accusations that have been leveled at the United States regarding the 
conditions of captivity are accurate; however, even the conditions which the United 
States admits to may be adequate to make a case for degrading treatment, forbidden 
by the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR),105 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),106 and by the applicable Geneva 
Conventions.107  Other provisions of UDHR and ICCPR, such as the guarantees of a 
fair and impartial hearing and equality before the law, and the bars against arbitrary 
arrest and detention, may be violated by the conditions at Guantánamo.108  The 
guarantee of personhood before the law may have been eroded by the legal status of 
the Guantánamo naval base.109  Even the right to life guaranteed by UDHR and 
ICCPR may be imperiled if the United States proceeds with plans to build a death 
                                                                
102See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  By terms of the 
Guantánamo Bay lease, Cuba maintains ultimate sovereignty even though the U.S. possesses 
total control; thus, it has been held that prisoners there are outside U.S. territory.  Id.
103See Lewis, supra note 94.  The Geneva Conventions guarantee certain rights and 
privileges to prisoners of war (among them the right to limited interrogations).  See id.  By 
simply redefining their detainees as “unlawful combatants” and the “war on terror” as not a 
war, the U.S. has effectively denied their captives these benefits.  Id.
104One such individual is Mehdi Ghezali, the only Swedish prisoner held at Guantánamo.  
Swedish authorities have expressed to their U.S. counterparts the opinion that Ghezali had no 
involvement with illegal behavior before his arrest, and indeed the U.S. has agreed.  Id.
Despite this apparent agreement, the U.S. nevertheless refuses to release Ghezali because he is 
“not cooperating with the authorities.”  Munir Ahmad and Tommy Grandell, Eleven 
Pakistanis Freed From Guantánamo Bay After Two Years of Imprisonment, THE GUARDIAN 
(LONDON), July 18, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/ 
0,2763,1000589,00.html (last visited August 23, 2003). 
105Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. 
No. 13, art. 5, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
106ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 7.  Note that under the terms of ICCPR Article 4, this is a 
non-derogable right.  Id. art. 4. 
107See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.  Of course, for this provision to apply to those 
captured in combat, they would have to be designated prisoners of war, which the U.S. 
steadfastly refuses to do.  
108UDHR, supra note 105, arts. 7, 9-10; ICCPR, supra note 83, arts. 9, 14. 
109UDHR, supra note 105, art. 6; ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 10. 
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row or execution chamber on the base.110  In short, the U.S. treatment of the prisoners 
taken during Operation Enduring Freedom and afterwards has denied them their very 
existence as individuals deserving of the protections of the international human 
rights system, while at the same time denying them any legal recourse to recover the 
benefits of those rights. 
These circumstances provide fertile ground upon which to interrogate the utility 
of a formal global citizenship.  To be sure, the hypothetical global passport system 
developed above is not intended to protect terrorists or encourage their ease of travel.  
However, at least some of the individuals held at Guantánamo are, by all accounts, 
innocent of any wrongdoing, yet still face indefinite detention and an undetermined 
fate.  Several countries have been vocal about their opposition to U.S. delays in 
determining the status of their citizens.  Yet, the ultimate fate of Afghan and Iraqi 
nationals remains unclear and undetermined.  Both of these nations have had their 
governments forcibly removed by the U.S. and its allies; in each case, the 
replacement government has no interest in securing the rights of its citizens.  If 
perhaps not officially, these citizens are nevertheless de facto stateless. 
For the Guantánamo prisoners, a formal global citizenship would help, through 
the action of an interested state, to secure the rights guaranteed to them by the  
UDHR, the ICCPR, and the Geneva Conventions.  Statelessness is, by definition, the 
lack of any state to exercise sovereignty over an individual, or in the Guantánamo 
situation, the lack of any desire to exercise sovereignty.  The United States has 
utilized the unique characteristics of Guantánamo to create a kind of faux
sovereignty over the detainees held there, and has used that sovereignty to redefine 
their fundamental identity as that of something less than people.  With no genuine 
international oversight (particularly for Afghanis and Iraqis), this false sovereignty is 
essentially the only sovereignty over these individuals.   
Formal global citizenship would allow Guantánamo captives to call upon a nation 
or nations that shares their cultural values, which could, in turn, attempt to protect 
their basic human rights by virtue of the deterritorialized, relational, and identity-
based connections between them.  For example, Iraqi nationals held in Guantánamo 
could call upon the government of Saudi Arabia to attempt to secure their release; 
given the warm relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. and the Saudi efforts to 
secure the rights and release of their own nationals, such an appeal is far more likely 
to succeed than a direct appeal to the U.S. or an indirect appeal to the U.S. through 
the occupying government in Iraq.111  A global passport would also increase the 
legitimacy of the claims of international human rights organizations, such as the 
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, to exercise some measure of oversight regarding the 
status of the detainees, their conditions of treatment, and the level of respect shown 
for their rights. 
                                                                
110UDHR, supra note 105, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 6; see Matthew Hay Brown, 
Gitmo Prisoners in No-Man’s-Land, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE (WEST VIRGINIA), July 25, 
2003, at P12A.  Again, by the terms of ICCPR Article 4, the right to life is non-derogable.  
ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 4. 
111See Saudi Legal Experts Form Team to Defend Prisoners Held in Guantanamo, THE 
BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Apr. 29, 2003 (recounting some of the efforts the Saudis have 
made to defend their nationals). 
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One case is of particular interest from the perspective of the global citizenship 
system presented here, as it involves a group of men who are likely to benefit, not 
simply from the stateless aspect of a formal global citizenship, but also from the 
possibilities it holds in the area of economics and freedom of travel.  On November 
8, 2002, four men—two brothers, Bisher and Wahab al-Rawi, and their business 
associates, Jamal El Banna and Abdullah El Janoudi—were arrested by Gambia's 
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) upon their arrival in Banjul, where they had set 
up a peanut processing plant.112  Some days earlier, El Banna had been visited by 
British intelligence agents who indicated knowledge of his intention to travel to 
Gambia, but expressed no objections.113  Nevertheless, El Banna, along with El 
Janoudi and Bisher al-Rawi, were arrested on November 2nd when they attempted to 
board a plane at Gatwick.114  They were held for two days, apparently because one of 
the men had a battery charger in his luggage.115  Though the men were released 
without being charged, the British allegedly informed the Gambians of the trip and 
advised the NIA to arrest the four men.116  The four were questioned by Gambian and 
U.S. officials for approximately a month, during which time they were threatened 
with beatings and rape.117  On December 5th, Wahab al-Rawi and Abdullah El 
Janoudi, both UK nationals, were released due to the intervention of the British high 
commissioner.118
Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil El Banna, however, remained in custody for 
approximately two months in Gambia thereafter, at which time they were transferred 
to U.S. custody and moved to Baghram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.119  After an 
indeterminate amount of time there, they were moved to Guantánamo Bay, where 
they remain.120  Britons in particular have taken issue with their government's 
treatment of the case; Bisher al-Rawi is an Iraqi national legally resident in the 
United Kingdom, while Jamil El Banna is a Jordanian with refugee status in the 
UK.121  However, “the British government is washing their hands” of the two men, 
according to one MP, despite the fact that both of them lack any other government to 
represent their interests.122  The MP, Edward Davey, suggested that the information 
                                                                
112Dodd, supra note 99. 
113See News Release, Amnesty International, UK: Government Must Act Now on Behalf 
of Guantánamo Detainees (July 11, 2003), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2003/ 
uk07112003.html (last visited August 23, 2003) [hereinafter AI Release]. 
114Id.
115Id.; Dodd, supra note 99. 
116See AI Release, supra note 113.  The British Foreign Office has since denied asking 
Gambia to arrest the four men.  Dodd, supra note 99. 
117Dodd, supra note 99. 
118Id.
119AI Release, supra note 113. 
120Id.
121Dodd, supra note 99. 
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the Gambian and U.S. officials had on Bisher al-Rawi “must have come from the UK 
authorities”, and that their suspicions may have been aroused by al-Rawi's hobbies, 
including “flying planes and parachuting.”123
Al-Rawi and El Banna could clearly enjoy the same benefits as other stateless 
individuals; as an Iraqi national, al-Rawi cannot count on the occupation government 
of England and the U.S. to do anything on his behalf, and similarly El Banna cannot 
hope for Jordan to intercede on his behalf when he fled that country because of 
persecution.124  But additional benefits may have accrued to these two gentlemen had 
they held global passports as described above.  For example, freedom of movement 
on their entry into Gambia would have doubtless been of great advantage.  Had the 
Gambians had legitimate reason to suspect they had terrorist ties, they could have 
refused them entry and returned them to the United Kingdom.  Further, any country 
which, in good faith, suspected the quartet of terrorist activity could have protested 
to the hypothetical global passport organization in an effort to prevent their 
acquisition of such a passport and the benefits that would arise from it.  
In short, these men, like many of those they are held with, seem to be innocent of 
any wrongdoing.  Yet, their situation is even more grim than many of those captured 
on the battlefields of Afghanistan; they were not taken captive as a direct result of 
the war on terror, and thus cannot hope to benefit from being classified as a prisoner 
of war.  It would certainly seem that these men were singled out because of their 
interests, because of their religion, because of their race, or some combination of the 
three.  By permitting them to appeal to a nation which shares their religious values or 
other cultural norms, rather than to nations which are either disinterested or openly 
hostile to their cause, some basic modicum of justice can be achieved, and they can 
enjoy the benefits of internationally recognized legal procedures. 
V.  CONCLUSION
In closing, it might be simplest to recount what the proposed formal global 
citizenship described here is not.  It is not an easy solution to the various problems 
raised by citizenship scholars over the past six decades.  Indeed, it does not comport 
perfectly with any citizenship theory.  On the other hand, it is clear that in a 
postnational world, a global citizenship can become a reality, even without a world 
government.  By being codified in treaty form, and by involving states in the 
administration of global citizenship, the model presented here peacefully co-exists 
with the sovereignty of nation-states.  Especially because of the limited infringement 
on sovereignty, formal global citizenship presents no insoluble theoretical problem. 
Additionally, though this essay touches only upon statelessness as the most 
immediate and tangible benefit to be gained from the formal global citizenship 
model, there are a number of other possibilities.  For example, there are symbolic 
benefits to be gained in creating a formal global citizenship.  The existence of a 
global passport and the ability to truly become a “citizen of the world” would make 
clear to skeptics that globalization is a reality.125  Linked to globalization and the 
symbolic benefits of a formal global citizenship, is the growth of social change under 
                                                                
123Id.
124Id.
125See Nussbaum, supra note 46, at 6-7.  For a broader analysis of cosmopolitanism, see
supra Part II.B. 
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the rubric of democracy.126  This move toward social change on the international 
plane is evident in the increased demand for uniform international human rights, 
environmental, and labor norms.127  By interrogating the fundamental validity of 
solely nation-based conceptions of citizenship while simultaneously preserving 
national sovereignty and cultural differences, global citizenship can encourage global 
discourse about such topics.128   
We have also alluded to potential functional benefits in the areas of free 
movement of persons and economics.  Freedom of movement–especially in this post-
September 11th world, where concerns about immigration security are heightened 
worldwide–necessarily raises serious concerns about permitting terrorists or other 
security risks into a nation’s borders.  However, the seriousness of this problem 
depends largely on the definition of “freedom of movement” one chooses to employ.  
One definition that might be viable for a global passport holder leaves nation-states 
in control of entry.  This definition incorporates as the components of free movement 
the rights to leave a country, to enter one’s own country, and to move freely within a 
country once admitted, but not to enter the country of one’s choosing.129  To be sure, 
such a definition would have been of great value to Bisher al-Rawi and Jamal El 
Banna on their arrival in Gambia. 
Another area fraught with potential benefits and dangers is economics.130 Indeed, 
international businessmen like al-Rawi and El Banna–representatives of global 
economics–could, in happier times, stand to gain the most from holding a global 
passport insofar as it facilitates their travel.  In many respects this would formalize 
traditional practice, as ties between the economic elite already exist informally by 
virtue of multinational corporations, international specialty groups, and the high 
mobility of the well educated.131  Increasing freedom of travel for economic reasons, 
however, raises concerns regarding the increased transnationality of unskilled and 
semiskilled labor.132  Another problem is one developing in the European Union: the 
freedom of the unemployed or impoverished to take advantage of the agreeable 
                                                                
126Barry A. Gills, Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy, 581 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 158, 160 (2002).  By “democracy,” Gills is referring to support 
for political and social change on a national and international level, as well as the creation of 
an international liberal economic order which is “universally inclusive”.  Id.  In this universal 
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Id. at 160-61. 
127Id. at 168. 
128It might seem odd to suggest that global citizenship can at once question and preserve 
national sovereignty.  The key word here is “solely”, for while national sovereignty is still 
very much alive (witness the Guantánamo situation), the significance of postnational 
developments cannot be denied. 
129Chander, supra note 16, at 1029 n.120. 
130See generally Sassen, supra note 56. 
131Id.  These bonds have been described as “[t]he denationalized fellowship and 
commonality that link many members of the transnational capitalist and managerial classes.”  
Bosniak, supra note 3, at 492. 
132See Fernández-Kelly, supra note 54, at 341-43. 
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welfare provisions of other states.133  Resolving these issues in the context of a global 
citizenship will not be easy and we do not purport to solve these problems here. 
The full breadth of the benefits that may accrue from a formal global citizenship 
remains to be seen, but real people can enjoy immediate betterment through such an 
apparatus.  By relying on deterritorialized, relational and identity-based conceptions 
of citizenship, a formal global citizenship can render the stateless functional citizens 
and permit them to seek the vindication of their human rights through nations who 
share their cultural or social values.  We have seen how such a conceptualization of 
global citizenship can be of real, practical benefit to individuals such as the detainees 
held in Guantánamo Bay who might otherwise have no one to defend their rights on 
the international plane.  The model of formal global citizenship proposed here is 
intended to be an incremental, rather than radical, step in globalization.  The aim is 
to provide real, practical benefits to individuals while paving the way to further 
international cooperation, and, at the same time, to provide the fulfillment of an 
ancient ideal by permitting an individual to truly become a “citizen of the world.”134
                                                                
133Theodora Kostakopoulou, Nested “Old” and “New” Citizenships in the European 
Union: Bringing Out the Complexity, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 389, 407-409 (1999).  Article 18 of 
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